Digital sovereignty as key to future earning capacity

The ability to make choices

The central question is where dependency is acceptable, where it becomes strategically risky, and for which parts of the digital stack the Netherlands itself must take the lead in order to create, retain and scale economic value. Those who provide digital infrastructure increasingly determine who has access to data, who innovates, who shapes markets and who captures the returns. Digital sovereignty therefore directly affects the Netherlands’ earning capacity. If critical data, compute power and platforms fall too far outside our sphere of influence, not only technological power but also economic value shifts elsewhere.

The role of data spaces

In this context, data spaces are an important enabler for strengthening digital sovereignty and boosting the Netherlands’ earning capacity. They are decentralised, agreement-based environments in which organisations can exchange data securely, in a controlled way and on equal terms, without centralising it or losing control. The promise is that data does not leak into closed platforms but is converted into new business activity, scalable applications and revenue models within Dutch and European ecosystems. This creates room for better AI applications, new services, more efficient value chains and sectoral innovation.

At the same time, data spaces are not yet a quick fix. Many European data space initiatives have emerged from subsidy-driven, supply-led innovation. The next phase requires sector-specific value propositions and scaling. Who will invest in a shared data space infrastructure before returns become visible? And how do you ensure that open standards facilitate entry without putting participants’ revenue models under pressure? Only when data spaces become financially viable they can sustainably enable value creation.

The sovereignty paradox

This makes digital sovereignty inherently paradoxical. More control can slow down innovation. More openness can increase dependency. More protection can support local players, but also reduce scale and weaken competitiveness. These tensions cannot be resolved with a single instrument such as regulation or funding. In practice, they require a nuanced approach in which government, industry and knowledge institutions act together.

For the Netherlands, this primarily means choosing where we can make a difference. Rather than trying to replicate a domestic Big Tech sector, the focus should be on targeted investment in domains where the Netherlands is strong, such as high-tech manufacturing, photonics, quantum technology and new forms of compute. At the same time, talent, investment capacity and interoperability standards must be strengthened. Government can play a role as a launching customer for data spaces.

‘Europe’s technological sovereignty is essential for strengthening competitiveness, resilience and strategic autonomy in a rapidly changing digital world.’

_{Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission}

Sovereignty as a strategic task

The key conclusion is that digital sovereignty is not an end state but a strategic task. The Netherlands does not need to own or develop everything itself. However, it must prevent others from determining which technological futures remain possible – and where economic value ultimately ends up. This does not require full independence, but the organisation of freedom of choice that takes into account mutual dependencies.

Only by building strong digital ecosystems now the Netherlands (and other European countries) can safeguard freedom of choice, innovative strength and future earning capacity. This also calls for international collaboration between partners that share similar standards for digital sovereignty, enabling them to pool strengths and create scale.